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ABSTRACT 
The management and understanding of modal split between public transport (PT) modes is 
of interest for numerous reasons. It may, for example, be desirable to stimulate passengers 
to switch from crowded buses and over to higher capacity rail. This requires a good 
understanding of drivers of transit modal substitution. 
 
The evidence put forward in this paper is based on more than 150 empirically estimated 
cross elasticities between PT modes from over 20 sources collected from Australia, Europe 
and USA. These sources include scientifically published evidence as well as grey literature. 
 
This evidence is coded into a database from which our paper presents and analyses the 
available cross-PT-modal demand relations. We focus on evidence for how fares, travel time 
and service intervals on PT ‘mode A’ affect the demand for PT ‘mode B’. 
 
Despite generally low levels of substitution between PT modes, passengers are particularly 
sensitive to in-vehicle, access/egress and waiting time in choosing PT mode and less so for 
fare variations. In general, rail demand is less sensitive to changes in bus than bus demand 
is to changes in rail. We also find that peak-hour demand more markedly switches between 
PT modes than off-peak demand does. 
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1. Introduction 
Within public transport (PT) systems there may, for various reasons, be of interest to better 
understand the dynamics of demand between PT modes, for example what happens to bus 
demand when metro services improve. Such knowledge may guide policymakers who seek 
to shift passenger flows away from overcrowded buses and onto higher capacity rail modes, 
as in Oslo (Ruter, 2015) or the other way round to encourage shifts from crowded metro 
systems and over to buses, which may be a goal for transit systems like London’s (Grayling 
and Glaister, 2000; BBC, 2006). The planning for and handling of unplanned disruptions and 
strikes would also benefit from improved knowledge of modal substitution between PT 
modes (Nguyen-Phuoc, et al., 2017a; Nguyen-Phuoc, et al., 2017b). On a higher level, better 
understanding of the level and aspects of competition between PT modes can help improve 
competition legislation and inform the many countries that still protect their heavy rail lines 
from competition with express coaches (Aarhaug and Fearnley, 2016; Augustin et al., 2014; 
Beria et al., 2014; Walter et al., 2011; van de Velde, 2009). In deregulated PT markets with 
free entry, evidence of key dimensions of intra-PT modal competition would be a competitive 
advantage for incumbents and potential entrants alike. 
 
A key indicator of competition between PT modes is the cross elasticity of demand (hereafter 
Ɛ ij), which is the demand effect on mode i when an attribute of mode j is changed marginally 
– for example the effect on demand for bus with respect to metro fares; if this cross elasticity 
of demand is, for example 0.2, one would expect that a 10 percent increase in metro fares 
increases bus demand by 2 percent. 
 
Cross elasticities of demand are relevant, although controversial1, indicators of competition 
also in the legal sense of competition law. In order for competition regulators and courts to 
define the ‘relevant market’, evidence of cross-price elasticities is sometimes used to support 
SSNIP test (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price). 
 
Following Dodgson (1986) and provided that PT modes are substitutes, cross-elasticities of 
demand, Ɛ ij, depend crucially on 1) own-elasticity of demand, Ɛ jj; 2) the two modes’ relative 
market shares, Qj/Qi; and 3) diversion factors, δ ji, which is a relative measure of the demand 
change in mode i compared to the demand change of mode j. The relationship can be written 
as, 
 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (1) 
 
It is clear from this formula that the cross-elasticity of demand for mode i with respect to an 
attribute of mode j is larger the larger mode j’s own elasticity is, the larger market share 
mode j has relative to mode i, and the higher diversion is from mode j to mode i. 
 
                                               
1 The ‘cellophane fallacy’ case (US Supreme Court, 1956) is regarded a famous case of erroneous 
use of cross-price elasticity evidence when defining market power and ‘relevant market’. 
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The relative market shares and the diversion factor will typically differ considerably between 
areas (see, e.g. the forthcoming RAND et al. study on diversion factors for UK DfT). Even 
within areas there may be large differences depending on, e.g., trip purpose, time of day, 
detailed location relative to various PT modes’ stops and stations, and so on. It follows that 
cross elasticities of demand are particularly context dependent, and much more so than own-
elasticities of demand whose levels show a remarkably high level of stability2.  
 
Figure 1 shows the relative share of transit modes in world cities and also for world regions 
of cities, drawing on data from UITP (2001;2015). In cities at the top of the figures, bus totally 
dominates over other PT modes. Here, a shift of only a small percentage of passengers from 
bus over to other PT modes would represent a large percentage increase in those other PT 
modes. At the bottom end of the figures, where bus has a relative minor role, the transfer of 
the same small percentage bus passengers over to other PT modes would represent a far 
less increase on those PT modes. This illustrates quite well the importance of context when 
analysing cross elasticities of demand. 
 
 
                                               
2 For example, the UK recommended own-price elasticity of demand for bus changed from -0.3 to -0.4 
between 1980 and 2004 (Webster and Bly, 1980; Balcombe et al., 2004). The Norwegian 
recommended value is -0.4 (Norheim and Ruud, 2007) and Litman’s (2017) global review concludes 
that short run transit fare elasticities are typically in the region of -0.2 to -0.5. 
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World Cities 
  
World Regions of Cities 
 
Figure 1: Transit Mode Share of Total Transit Demand in Selected World Cities and for 
World Regions of Cities. Source: Analysis of UITP 2001, 2015 data. 
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The demand elasticities literature draws a line between “conditional” and “unconditional” 
demand elasticities (Balcombe et al., 2004). “Conditional” means that the elasticity estimate 
is conditional upon a similar attribute change across all those attributes. E.g. all fares change 
by X % (and not just the price of one ticket type, like the single ticket price), or alternatively 
that all PT fares in an area change by the same percentage (and not just of one of the PT 
modes). “Unconditional” elasticity estimates, on the other hand relax this assumption and 
implies that a change in an attribute (e.g. price of monthly travel card) can be the only 
change (other ticket prices do not change) taking place. Since the barriers to switching 
between ticket types or, to some extent, between PT modes are typically regarded as less 
strong than barriers to switching to/from non-PT modes (or not travel), the general 
expectation is for unconditional elasticities to be larger, in absolute terms, than conditional 
elasticities. A big increase in, say, the singe ticket price will typically lead to large change in 
market shares of different ticket types, i.e. a large unconditional demand elasticity, but have 
less effect on overall PT demand. Most usually in the own-elasticity literature, elasticities of 
demand refer to changes that are conditional upon an attribute change of the same 
magnitude that applies to all PT modes or fare types. However, and in contrast to this, the 
focus in this paper is largely on unconditional elasticities, since cross-elasticity of demand 
between PT modes by definition relies on changes in attributes of one PT mode only. 
 
Based on this background, the purpose of this paper is to present and analyse existing 
evidence of cross elasticities of demand between PT modes in particular in urban areas. In 
doing so, we seek to lay the foundation for improved understanding of the dynamics of 
demand between different PT modes. The potential benefits and beneficiaries of this paper 
are many, as described above, although this paper is primarily motivated by a genuine 
curiosity and a deep interest in passenger transport demand, which these co-authors have 
shared for years. 
 
When studying cross elasticities of demand between PT modes, there is an obvious question 
whether in fact PT modes operate parallel routes in such a way that there occurs real 
competition between them. There is great variation between cities and countries in this 
respect. The ‘traditional’ planning paradigm would oppose operations of parallel services, 
e.g. of bus and rail, so as to minimise cannibalism and to promote the different modes’ scale 
economies. Such duplication of expensive resources would be regarded as wasteful. From 
this perspective, different PT modes serve different markets and competition between those 
modes is very limited. An alternative view would be that in any sizable city with more than 
one PT mode in operation with a reasonable service network, there would usually be several 
alternative PT routes and modes between most OD pairs and therefore there may be 
considerable competition between those PT modes and routes. A typical example would be 
transit services between a city centre and its airport. From this perspective it is of relevance 
to investigate outcomes of changes to one of the alternative PT modes on all other PT 
modes. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the process of 
identifying data and provides an overview of the sources of evidence that goes onto the 
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analysis. Section 3 presents and analyses the data, while section 4 discusses the findings 
and draws conclusions and their policy implications. 
 
 
2. Method and data  
This review brings together evidence from a wide range of sources. The library search 
includes resources such as ISI, Google Scholar, World Transit Research database, Bureau 
of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics (BITRE) Elasticities Database Online, 
Springer Link, ScienceDirect, and Tylor and Francis Online. Search terms typically consisted 
of combinations of (transport* or travel or passenger), cross, elasticit*, demand, (transit or 
bus or public transport or rail or tram or metro or LRT or BRT), (urban or city or local), and so 
on. Additionally, we contacted, directly, a number of colleagues across the globe, who were 
considered likely to either hold unpublished material or to help us point to important pieces of 
work in this area. 
 
This exercise resulted in the identification of 20 different sources of literature. Of these, 15 
were primary sources and 5 secondary (cited) sources. From this sample of 20 references, 
174 different cross-elasticity estimates between PT modes are recorded. To our knowledge, 
this is the largest data set of cross elasticity evidence between public transport modes ever 
assembled and analysed. Although our focus is on local transit, we included a few notable 
contributions that refer to intercity transport and longer distance trips. Each source has been 
coded into a spreadsheet table with information about location, year, study type, data type, 
method, estimated cross elasticity estimate, and so on. Table 1 presents the 20 sources and 
which cross elasticity relations they cover, while table 2 presents some key characteristics of 
these sources.  
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Table 1: References in database and cross-PT-modal relations covered. (Demand for 
first mentioned mode with respect to last mode. E.g. “bus-rail” means demand for bus 
with respect to change in a rail attribute.) 
Reference No. and source Demand relations covered 
1. Dargay et al. (2010) Bus-rail; rail-bus 
2. Dargay (2010) Bus-rail; rail-bus 
3. Douglas et al. (2003) Bus-rail; rail-bus 
4. Fairhurst and Morris (1975) LRT-bus 
5. Flügel et al. (2015) Bus-rail; LRT/metro-bus; LRT/metro-rail; rail-LRT/metro; bus-LRT 
6. Glaister and Lewis (1997) Bus-rail; LRT-bus; bus-LRT 
7. Mackett and Bird (1989) Bus-rail 
8. Mc Fadden (1974) Bus-rail; rail-bus; LRT-bus 
9. MVA (1996) Bus-rail; rail-bus 
10. MVA (2008) Rail-bus 
11. Oscar Faber TPA (1993) Bus-rail; rail-bus 
12. Rich and Mabit (2011) Bus-rail; rail-bus 
13. Rohr et al. (2013) Bus-rail 
14. Steer Davies Gleave (1996) Bus-rail; metro-rail; bus-metro; metro-bus 
15. Talvitie (1973) Bus-rail; rail-bus 
16. Taplin et al. (1999) Bus-rail; rail-bus 
17. Toner and Wardman (1993) Bus-rail; rail-bus 
18. Wardman (1993) Rail-bus 
19. Wardman (1992) Rail-bus 
20. Wardman and Whelan (1995) Rail-bus 
 
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of sample, N=20. “na” typically refers to secondary sources. 
Publication type 6 published report; 5 journal/book; 4 unpublished academic; 2 conference paper; 2 
thesis; 1 other 
Country/region covered 13 UK/GB; 1 Norway; 2 Australia; 2 USA; 1 Scotland; 1 Europe 
General method 9 predicting with choice model; 4 regression model; 2 deduced; 2 transport model; 3 
other/na 
RP/SP 12 RP; 3 SP; 3 RP-SP; 2 other/na 
Type of data 9 cross sectional; 4 time series; 3 pseudo panel/SP; 4 other/na 
Level 4 national; 9 urban; 1 international; 2 station-to-station flow; 4 other/na 
Location 9 urban; 7 interurban; 4 long distance 
Year of publication 3 before 1980; 1 1980-89; 9 1990-99; 2 2000-09; 5 2010 and later 
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3. Empirical evidence and meta-analysis 
3.1 Overall tendencies 
Table 3 shows the assembled values for internal transit mode cross elasticities under the 
separate policy change headings of fares, in-vehicle journey time, wait time, access/egress 
time and number of interchanges. Values shown are the average of cross elasticity evidence 
assembled with min/max values also shown. 
 
Some 174 separate values were assembled. Most (76) related to fare change evidence 
followed by cases where in-vehicle travel time had been adjusted (53). Most evidence 
concerned changes in transit modes which affected rail demand (80) and bus demand (78). 
Few cases of metro and light rail demand impacts have been documented. Metro cases only 
considered changes in fares between transit modes. 
 
All values in Table 3 are positive as would be expected, since all attributes in question are 
‘bads’ (cost, time, interchanges, hassle). It means that an increase in these attributes for one 
PT mode will, all else equal, make it less attractive and thereby increase demand for other 
PT modes. 
 
Average transit cross elasticity values ranged from a minimum of 0.01 to a maximum of 0.48. 
The highest average value of 0.48 was for bus demand impacted by changes in in-vehicle 
journey time by rail. The implication is that, all other things being equal, a 10% reduction in 
journey time by rail would act to reduce bus demand by 4.8%. The second highest average 
value is 0.38 for bus demand being impacted by changes in access/egress and transfer time 
on light rail. The implication is a 10% reduction in light rail access/egress and transfer time 
would reduce bus demand by 3.8%. 
 
In general, rail demand is less elastic (or stickier) to changes in bus than bus demand is to 
changes in rail. For example, a 10% fare decrease on rail relative to bus decreases bus 
demand by 2.8% (Ɛ ij=0.28) while a 10% relative decrease in fares by bus acts to decrease 
rail demand by only 1.5% (Ɛ ij=0.15). This pattern is apparent for almost all policy variables. 
Interestingly it does not follow for the number of interchanges; Ɛ ij=0.03 for the number of rail 
interchanges impacting on bus demand, but is a massive 0.24 for bus impacting on rail 
demand. The implication is that a 10% decrease in the number of interchanges by rail acts to 
decrease bus demand by 0.3% but a 10% decrease in bus interchange acts to decrease rail 
demand by 2.4%. However, only a single set of data points is behind this evidence so this 
result must be taken with a good degree of caution. 
 
The lowest average cross elasticity values in Table 3 concern changes in policy variables for 
rail and their impact on light rail (fares, in-vehicle journey time, wait time and interchanges) 
and for changes in light rail wait time impacting rail demand. We can conclude from this that 
heavy and light rail system demands are relatively insensitive to each other while bus 
demand is much more sensitive to rail and heavy rail. Metro is also quite insensitive to rail 
but again there is not much evidence to go on from available sources. 
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By mode, bus demand is most sensitive to rail in-vehicle travel time (Ɛ ij=0.48), light rail 
access/egress/transfer time (Ɛ ij=0.38) and rail wait time (Ɛ ij=0.22). Bus demand is most 
insensitive to rail interchange (Ɛ ij=0.03) and light rail wait time (Ɛ ij=0.05). However, for all low 
values of elasticities there are commonly few data points. 
 
Rail demand is most sensitive to bus in-vehicle time (e Ɛ ij=0.26), bus interchange (Ɛ ij=0.24) 
followed by bus fare (Ɛ ij=0.15). Rail demand is least sensitive to light rail wait time (Ɛ ij=0.01), 
light rail fare (Ɛ ij=0.02) followed by light rail interchange and in-vehicle time (Ɛ ij=0.06). 
 
Table 3: Summary of Internal Cross-Modal Transit Elasticities Assembled from the 
Research Literature & Practice Review 
 
 
 
Light rail demand is most sensitive to bus interchange (Ɛ ij=0.23) and bus fare (Ɛ ij=0.21) 
followed by bus in-vehicle time (Ɛ ij=0.15). Light rail demand is less sensitive to almost all rail 
based policy measures. However, for all light rail demand related values except bus fare, 
there is only a single point of evidence for each case. 
 
Metro demand data is only available for changes in bus and rail fares. Metro demand is most 
sensitive to bus fare (Ɛ ij=0.21) and least to rail fare (0.10) however again there are only 
single data points of evidence available for each case. 
 
The minimum and maximum values in Table 3 illustrate the range of values found in the 
review. The highest maximum values found are above 1.00 and all relate to bus demand 
affected by changes in rail fares (Ɛ ij max=1.31), rail in-vehicle travel time (Ɛ ij max=1.09) and 
rail wait time (Ɛ ij max=1.00). Maximum values of this scale emphasise how bus demand is 
sensitive to changes rail design but again caution is warranted since only a few data points 
are available in the evidence; values of this scale certainly represent extremes of experience 
– e.g. caused by extreme relative market shares. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the relative average values of cross modal internal transit elasticities by 
mode of demand affected (rail, bus, light rail and metro). This illustrates the imbalance of 
changes in rail based modes on bus demand vs changes in bus on rail demand; bus demand 
has the highest cross elasticities notably for rail in-vehicle time as related above. Bus 
demand is also highly sensitive to light rail access/egress and transfer time. Rail demand is 
N Mean Min Max N Mean Min Max N Mean Min Max N Mean Min Max N Mean Min Max
Bus 5 0.21 0.11 0.28 1 0.15 0.15 0.15 1 0.06 0.06 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.03 1 0.23 0.23 0.23
Rail 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 1 0.06 0.06 0.06 1 0.01 0.01 0.01
Light rail 3 0.16 0.10 0.25 1 0.15 0.15 0.15 1 0.05 0.05 0.05 2 0.38 0.38 0.38 1 0.17 0.17 0.17
Rail 31 0.28 0.02 1.31 23 0.48 0.03 1.09 9 0.22 0.03 1.00 5 0.15 0.03 0.34 1 0.03 0.03 0.03
Metro 1 0.16 0.16 0.16
Light rail 1 0.02 0.02 0.02 1 0.06 0.06 0.06 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 2 0.11 0.11 0.11 1 0.06 0.06 0.06
Bus 32 0.15 0.01 0.49 26 0.26 0.02 0.91 12 0.08 0.03 0.18 3 0.13 0.04 0.25 1 0.24 0.24 0.24
Bus 1 0.21 0.21 0.21
Rail 1 0.10 0.10 0.10
IVT/journey time Wait time/headway Access/egress/transfer time  No. of interchangesFare
Change in Policy Variable
..With respect 
toDemand 
for..
Light rail
Bus
Rail
Metro
Thredbo 15 paper template and guidelines 
 
 
Page 10 of 18 
 
 
 
more influenced by bus in-vehicle time and the number of interchanges. Light rail demand is 
more influenced by the number of bus interchanges. All other patterns have quite small cross 
modal elasticity effects (Ɛ ij < 0.2). 
 
  
  
Figure 2: Average Internal Transit Cross Modal Elasticities - Mode Affected and Mode 
Changed – 5 types of policy change. 
 
 
 
3.2 Statistical analysis 
In this section, we present a regression model on the cross-elasticities identified in the 
literature study, i.e. we perform a formal meta-analysis, a methodological approach that is 
widely applied in transportation research (Holmgren, 2007; Melo et al., 2013; Wardman, 
2014). 
 
The motivation in our case is threefold: 1) we want to test if the general patterns observed 
and discussed in the previous section are retained after controlling for market shares and the 
applied method 2) we want to measure the effect and test for statistical significance of factors 
affecting cross-elasticities 3) we want to present a simple model that may be used to predict 
cross-elasticities in scenarios where data is lacking.  
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Cases involving metro are excluded from this analysis because of the low number of 
observation regarding that transport mode. 
 
The presented model is mathematically given as: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐+∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚∗𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚+∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎∗𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎=1𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚=1 +∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐∗𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐=1 +∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑∗𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑+𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑=1 +𝜀𝜀 
 
Where; 
• CE >0 is the cross-elasticity identified by the literature study. 
• 𝑐𝑐 is the constant term. 
• 𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 are dummy variables identifying the mode combination of affected x altered mode. 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚 
are the corresponding parameters. 
• 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎 are dummy variables identifying the underlying attribute. 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎 are the corresponding 
parameters. 
• 𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐 are dummy variables identifying the country/continent. 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 are the corresponding 
parameters. 
• 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 are dummy variables identifying the type of dataset (RP, SP or combined RP-SP). 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑 
are the corresponding parameters. 
• RMS >0 is the relative market share of the altered mode compared to the affected mode 
This variable is log-transformed which helps interpretation. 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 is the corresponding 
parameter.  
• 𝜀𝜀 is an IID-normally distributed error term. 
 
The specification as a log-transformed model is supported by tests we performed indicating 
heteroscedasticity and detected heteroscedasticity (Breusch-Pagan, 1979; Cook-Weisberg, 
1983). After a log-transformation the model constitutes a linear regression models that can 
be estimated with the standard least square method. The beta-parameters measure the relative effect (percent change) of the covariate on the cross-elasticity compared to the 
normalised level. The reference categories are m=Rail×Bus, a=fare, c=Australia, d=RP. Note 
that 𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 (i.e. 𝑒𝑒 to the power of c, or exp(c)) is the cross elasticity of normalised level, provided 
that the altered and affected mode have the same market shares (RMS=1). Table 4 presents 
model estimates. 
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Table 4: Linear regression. Dependent variable: LN(Estimated cross elasticity). 
“Affected mode × Altered mode” is interpreted as demand for affected mode with 
respect to an attribute change of the altered mode. 
 
Coefficient SE 
Affected mode × Altered mode   
Light rail × Bus 0.142 -0.351 
Light rail × Rail -1.442*** -0.466 
Bus × Light Rail 0.511 -0.376 
Bus × Rail 0.138 -0.174 
Rail × Light Rail -1.117** -0.454 
Rail ×Bus Ref 
 Attribute   
Fare Ref  
In-vehicle/journey time 0.467*** -0.163 
Waiting time/headway -0.442** -0.217 
Access/egress/transfer time 0.245 -0.283 
No. of interchanges 0.191 -0.417 
Country   
Australia Ref  
Europe -0.671 -0.42 
Norway -0.0629 -0.368 
US 0.48 -0.382 
United Kingdom 0.477** -0.235 
LN(Relative market share) 0.459*** -0.0776 
RPSP 
RP  Ref  
SP 0.703** -0.283 
Combined -0.00486 -0.19 
Constant -2.433*** -0.296 
Observations 171 
 R-squared 0.482 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.428 
 Log Likelihood -210.8 
 *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
   
 
To ease interpretation of the model, regard a situation where we are interested in predicting 
the cross-elasticity of changes in train headway on the demand for buses in a (hypothetical) 
Norwegian study based on SP-data. Assuming the relative market share of train compared to 
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buss to be 0.5, the cross elasticity is then calculated as: 
𝑒𝑒−2.433+0.138−0.442−0.0629+0.703+ln (0.5) = 0.0614 
 
Taking a closer look at the parameter estimates, we see that cross-elasticities between light-
rail and train are significantly lower than between rail and bus. This might be intuitive given 
that light train and train do seldom share the same market (light train seldom operates on 
long distances) while buss services are a closer substitute to train given that the also operate 
on longer distances. This is in line with the overall tendency found in the previous section. 
 
The parameter estimates give a strong indication for that in-vehicle time has a stronger 
demand effect than fares, given the significant positive parameter on the cross-elasticity. The 
results suggest that in-vehicle time implies a 46,7% higher cross-elasticities than fares. 
Headway/waiting time yields lower cross-elasticities than fares (and in-vehicle time). 
 
There seems to be an indication for that studies from the UK produce higher estimates 
compared to Australia (and Europe/Norway). This finding is hard to interpret without going 
deeper into the material – which is outside of the scope of this paper. 
 
The relative market share has – as expected – a high and statically significant effect on 
cross-elasticities. A 1% change in this variable leads to 0.459% higher cross-elasticity.  
 
Finally, we find evidence for that SP studies predict the highest cross-elasticities; significantly 
higher than RP-studies (and combined RP-SP studies). This is an interesting finding from a 
methodological point of view and seems to be in line with caveats of using SP studies for 
demand studies because of the inherent hypothetical bias attached to SP-studies (Hensher 
and Li, 2010). 
 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
Although we are unaware of any review studies or meta-analysis that has gathered the 
amount of evidence of cross elasticities of demand between transit modes which is 
presented in this paper, we are still left with a mere 20 references and 174 cross elasticity 
estimates. This limited amount of evidence is an indication of a knowledge gap, which would 
be useful to fill. For the purposes of our meta-analysis, however, the main implication of the 
limited amount of evidence is the fact that, when broken down by different modal pairs and 
attributes, most cross elasticity relations estimated are based on few observations (N). The 
only cross elasticity evidence with a considerable amount of evidence (N>10), refers to 
combinations between bus and rail and for changes in fares, travel time and headway. For 
the remaining cross elasticity relations, available evidence is extremely scarce in the 
literature. This means that the evidence and findings of this paper must be treated with a 
great amount of caution. Adding to that, cross elasticities are particularly context dependent. 
Therefore, this compilation of evidence from across the globe brings in additional uncertainty 
that should be kept in mind, even when the statistical analysis has controlled for contextual 
variables including study location. 
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Having regards to these caveats, the review and meta-analysis identifies a few moderately 
robust insights.  
 
One is that competition between rail and LRT is almost non-existing. Bus, on the other side, 
appears to compete with both rail on longer trips and light rail on shorter trips. The 
implication is that, where rail modes seek to attract more passengers (as in Oslo) or where 
the demand for rail modes is exceeding rail capacity (as may be the case in London), bus is 
likely the most relevant alternative mode, which passengers would be diverted from (Oslo) or 
to (London), respectively. 
 
Another is the fact that travel time seems to be the most important aspect of inter-modal 
competition, followed by fare, access/egress/transfer time, and number of interchanges. 
Interestingly, waiting time comes out as the attribute with the lowest cross elasticity, when 
correcting for other aspects of the study. Although this finding may be uncertain due to few 
observations, it may be related to the amount each of these attributes add to passengers’ 
Generalised Costs (GC). Since our data primarily refers to urban transport, where service 
frequencies in general are likely to be high, waiting time may add less to GC than travel time 
and fares do. The policy implication is to focus on travel time differences between PT modes, 
if the goal is to shift passengers between PT modes. However, the extent to which travel 
times are in fact possible to change significantly on a system level, is a question for debate. 
One may argue that relative prices (i.e. fares) are easier to change, despite their potential 
political (and budgetary) costs. 
 
A third is related to study area and methods applied. UK studies report much higher cross 
elasticities than studies from other countries and continents, all else equal, as do stated 
preference studies. There is not enough information in the data to investigate this further, but 
future studies should scrutinise these preliminary findings. 
 
Fourth, we find statistical support for the theoretical argument that market shares play 
important role for the magnitude of cross elasticities. The finding is reassuring and, indeed, it 
helps cast some confidence on the statistical meta-analysis. 
 
The cross modal internal demand effects presented in this paper are caused by a number of 
likely influences; these are hypothesised below. 
 
1. The Relative Scale of Transit Mode – separate transit modes almost always have a 
different scale of coverage of cities with bus services generally dominating and light rail 
and metros representing a smaller share of metropolitan area wide service area coverage 
and ridership. There are exceptions to this generalisation but in general, bus services 
tend to dominate at least in spatial network coverage terms in cities. It follows that the 
scale of change in bus policy measures (fares, level of service etc.) would thus dominate 
demand effects of rail based modes compared to rail mode effects. However, this only 
works if bus competes with rail directly for the same market. In practice, rail is by 
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definition a longer distance mode and bus less so. In our data rail policy changes tended 
to have much greater market effects than bus did on rail markets. The implication is that 
despite bus markets, in general, being bigger, they don’t compete for the same market. 
Hence, rail is somewhat protected from changes in bus policy but bus is more sensitive to 
changes in rail policy. So there appears to be more to relative market competition than 
just relative market size. 
 
2. The Relative Scale of Own Mode Walk Access vs Cross Mode Feeder Transfer 
Demand – If the market for a transit mode involves almost entirely walk on 
access/egress then cross elasticity transit elasticities should be smaller than for modes 
with high shares of ridership making interchanges from other transit modes. While this 
hypothesis seems logical we doubt there are any clear patterns of ridership in cities 
where specific modes have more or less inter-transit transfer shares than others. Rail has 
strong walk on ridership but bus feeder to and from rail is also dominant in many cities 
and this effect would act to influence both bus and rail. We also see no clear patterns in 
the cross elasticity results which can prove or disprove this hypothesis. In practice, actual 
effects will vary in the real world by variations in circumstances between cities. 
 
3. Effects of Near Catchment Competition Between Transit Modes – In general close 
spatial proximity between the alignments and stops/stations of transit modes should act 
to increase cross model market effects. The inverse of this effect is that modes with 
spatially segregated alignments, located well away from other modes should have 
smaller cross modal demand effects. As mentioned in section 1, it is a core principal of 
integrated network planning of transit systems that transit modes work together to 
achieve a wider spatial distribution of services and that wasteful competition and overlap 
of routes is avoided. Key to this principle is that rail modes, due to their high cost, are 
protected from competition from nearby bus routes. On this basis we might expect rail, 
light rail and metro demand to display much lower demand elasticities than bus and 
indeed this is the dominant picture of the results displayed in Table 3 and Figure 2. 
Another example of this principle is that light rail and rail in particular are rarely spatially 
adjacent in the real world due to the high costs of construction and operation. This 
suggests interaction between rail and light rail markets would be small. This indeed is 
supported by the cross elasticity results presented above. However, the real world is a 
complex place and area wide network integration has not been achieved in all cities; it 
also varies in quality within cities. Indeed, commercial competition occurs in places and 
this might act to dampen the transit mode effects hypothesised above. We also note that 
‘Force feeding’ of ridership to rail (metro and light rail) stations from bus is also 
undertaken to achieve the same network integration objective and this might act to 
counteract cross model effects since as noted above (point 2) cross transit mode feeding 
can act to increase cross modal demand sensitivity. 
 
Overall, the cross modal internal transit mode elasticities assembled in this research 
represent one of the first times that this subject has been explored in any depth. There are 
clearly large gaps in evidence and future research should seek to fill these. While this meta-
study has only scratched the surface, it would be useful to explore further the factors causing 
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the variations in patterns of cross transit modal demand effects discovered in future 
research. Despite the gaps in evidence found in this review it has provided a range of 
insights into cross transit modal demand effects which should prove of value to planners, 
policy makers and industry stakeholders into the future. 
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